We address the problem of performing a multiparty computation when more than half of the processors are cooperating Byzantine faults. We show how to compute any boolean function of n inputs distributively, preserving the privacy of inputs held by nonfaulty processors, and ensuring that faulty processors obtain the function value "if and only if" the nonfaulty processors do. If the nonfaulty processors do not obtain the correct function value, they detect cheating with high probability. Our solution is based on a new type of verifiable secret sharing in which the secret is revealed not all at once but in small increments. This slow-revealing process ensures that all processors discover the secret at roughly the same time. Our solution assumes the existence of an oblivious transfer protocol and uses broadcast channels. We do not require that the processors have equal computing power.
Introduction
Consider a network of n processors, each holding a private input zi. Given a function j( zi, . . . , z,,), the processors must compute j while maintaining the privacy of the local inputs. The problem of achieving correct and private computation of j in the presence of malicious processor faults has recently received much attention in 1191, [51, [6l. PI, I31, PI , [71, 141 among others.
In this paper we consider the case that more than haljthe network consists of cooperating Byzantine faults. The faulty processors are allowed probabilistic polynomial time. We assume broadcast channels are available. Our main result is a completeness theorem for multiparty boolean protocols tolerating any number of faults.
Lot n be the total number of players in the network and t < n be the number of faulty players.
Let j : D1 x . . -x D, -+ GF(2) be any polynomial-time boolean function.Onr solution satisfies four essential properties (formal definitions can be found in the fulI version of the paper in the proceedings of FOCS89.):
l Independence of Inputs:
The faulty players choose and commit to their inputs x; independently of the honest players inputs.
At the the end of the execution of the protocol, t Byzantine faults cannot to compute any more information about honest players inputs than already implied by the faulty players' private inputs and outputs. The assumption of an oblivious transfer protocol is necessary.
